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The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act For Ohio
With the developments in modern transportation, and larger
and more frequent mass gatherings today, the incidence of simul-
taneous deaths has greatly increased. One of the many legal prob-
lems resulting from such deaths involves the devolution of property.
For example, a husband and his wife are riding on a train. There is
a serious accident which, as far as the facts are ascertained, re-
sults in the simultaneous deaths of the married pair. Whose heirs
should get their respective property? Do their wills, if they have
any, take care of this particular exigency?
Under civil law codes, when such deaths occurred a presump-
tion was spelled out in terms of the age and sex of the decedents.
Louisiana has adopted such a method.'
A few jurisdictions presume that both died at the same time,2
so that one seeking to prove that his donor survived the other must
overcome the presumption.
A third rule, the one adopted by most common-law states, is
that there is no presumption as to survival. Hence the necessity of
additional proof to overcome a presumption is absent, yet this rule
gives no adequate solution to the riddle. One whose rights depend
upon the survival of one of the decedents, has the burden of proof
to show such survival, but if the deaths were truly simultaneous
this burden could not be met.
The law in Ohio is unsettled as to whether we follow the com-
mon-law rule of no presumption I or the rule that both are pre-
sumed to have died simultaneously.4
I "If those who have perished together were under the age of fifteen
years, the eldest shall be presumed to have survived.
"If they were above the age of sixty years, the youngest shall be
presumed to have survived.
"If some were under sixty years of age, and some were sixty years
of age or older, the first shall be presumed to have survived.
"If some were under the age of fifteen years, and some were fifteen
years or older and less than sixty years of age, the latter shall be presumed
to have survived.
"If those who have perished together were fifteen years of age or older
and under sixty years, the male shall be presumed to have survived, where
there was an equality of age or a difference of less than one year, other-
wise the younger must be presumed to have survived the elder whether
male or female." LA. Crv. CODE, Art. 938, 939 (1947).
2 Conway and Bertsche, The New York Simultaneous Death Law, 13
FoaD L. REV. 19 (1944).
3 Ware v. Kinch, 29 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 353 (1919).
- In re Francis, 29 Ohio Op. 502 (P. Ct. 1940).
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TnE UNIFo~u ACT AND THE OHIO STATUTES
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was drafted to meet the
problems arising from simultaneous deaths.5 This Uniform Act has
been enacted in thirty-four states since its drafting in 1941.6
Section 1 of the Act provides:
Where the title to property or the devolution thereof
depends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient
evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simul-
taneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of
as if he had survived, except as provided otherwise in this
Act.7
Ohio adopted a statute in 1932 which covers in substance the
same material as found in the above section." The intent and effect
has been that the tproperty which belonged to each decedent prior
to his death shall descend to his respective heirs at law. There is no
presumption established but rather another arbitrary answer to the
problem.
Section 2 governs the disposition of property when successive
beneficiaries die at the same time. It states:
Where two or more beneficiaries are designated to take
successively by reason of survivorship under another per-
son's disposition of property and there is no sufficient evi-
dence that these beneficiaries have died otherwise than
simultaneously the property thus disposed of shall be di-
vided into as many equal portions as there are successive
beneficiaries and these portions shall be distributed respec-
tively to those who would have taken in the event that each
designated beneficiary had survived.9
This section would be applicable in only a few situations. One
is where A gives B a life estate and the remainder to C if C sur-
vives B, otherwise to D. If B, C, and D died simultaneously the
property would be divided between C and D. Perhaps the term
"alternatively" should be used as well as the term "successively"
to avoid a strict interpretation of the latter term.10 Ohio's present
5 9 UNiFomW LAWS ANN. 657 (1942).
6 Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa,
Kan., Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. H., N. J., N. Y.,
N. C., N. D., Ore., Pa., R. I., S. D., Tenn., Vt., Wash., Wis., and Wyo. 9
UNiFoRm LAWS ANN. 182 (Supp. 1947).
79 UImronmv LAws ANN. 659 (1942).
8 'TWhen there is no evidence of the order in which the death of two or
more persons occurred, no one of such persons shall be presumed to have
died first and the estate of each shall pass and descend as though he had
survived the other or others... ." Oxno GEN. CODE § 10503-18 (1938).
69 IUNkomw LAws AN 659 (1942).
10 KAN. LAWS c. 239 § 2 (1947); WASH. REv. STAT. AwN. § 1370-2 (Supp.
1943).
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statutory law will not settle the above problem; rather, the result
would depend upon which one has the burden of proof.
Section 3 provides:
Where there is no sufficient evidence that two joint
tenants or tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than
simultaneously the property so held shall be distributed
one-half as if one had survived and one-half as if the other
had survived. If there are more than two joint tenants and
all of them have so died the property thus distributed shall
be in proportion that one bears to the whole number of
joint tenants."
This section, in its present form, would be of doubtful applica-
tion in Ohio. Conveyances of either personalty or realty to two or
more persons are almost uniformly construed to create tenancies in
common rather than joint tenancies. 1 2 Joint tenancies in land are
said not to exist in Ohio. 3 The same result is reached when there
is a conveyance to a husband and wife.14 However, instruments giv-
ing a common interest to two or more persons with a right of sur-
vivorship are recognized as valid." The section is apparently not
applicable to persons who take under such an instrument. If it were
to provide for this contingency, the scope of its application would
be greatly increased.
The above sections of the Uniform Act and the Ohio statute
dealing with simultaneous deaths govern the distribution of prop-
erty belonging to the decedent at the time of his death. The pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy do not come into existence until the
death of the insured and are not deemed to be the decedent's prop-
erty. So such a statute as Section 4 of the Act is a necessary one.
Section 4. Where the insured and the beneficiary in a
policy of life or accident insurance have died and there is
no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise than
simultaneously, the proceeds of the policy shall be dis-
tributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary. 6
Under the present Ohio law, if the insured reserved the right
to change the beneficiary and the insured and beneficiary die at the
same time, the heirs of the insured would take the proceeds of the
policy.'7 Since the insured has reserved the right to change the
1"9 UNIFORm LAWS ANN. 660 (1942).
12 Wilson and Marsh v. Fleming, 13 Ohio 68 (1844).
13 Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 1 (1826); Lessee of Miles v. Fisher,
10 Ohio 1 (1840).
'14Farmers' & Merch. Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, 12 N.E. 439
(1887).
15 In re Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929); Martin, The
Incident of Survivorship in Ohio, 3 O-O ST. L. J. 48 (1936).
I6 9 UNIFoRm LAWS ANN. 660 (1942).
'7 In re Francis, 29 Ohio Op. 502 (P. Ct. 1940).
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beneficiary, the beneficiary does not have a vested interest in the
policy and hence the heirs of the beneficiary have the burden of
proof of showing that the beneficiary survived the insured. Where
the insured has not reserved the option to change the beneficiary
and the policy was payable to the beneficiary if surviving, it has
been held that the beneficiary has a vested interest, subject to.be-
ing divested by her predeceasing the insured and that the repre-
sentatives of the insured have the burden of proof that the benefic-
iary had not survived the insured.1 8
It is apparent that the drafters of this Uniform Act have felt
that the insured has the primary interest in determining who should
get the proceeds of the insurance policy, and that normally he would
rather have his heirs possess the funds if the one he had chosen
could not participate in the benefits. To be sure, if the policy ex-
pressly provided that the beneficiary and his heirs and assigns
should take regardless of the priority of death then the courts
would not have to rely on the presumption established by the Act.-0
Section 5 provides that, "This Act shall not apply to the dis-
tribution of the property of a person who has died before it takes
effect." 20 It is inserted to prevent any attempted retroactive ap-
plication of the Act. New York and Massachusetts have both added
to this section an additional precaution so that the Act will not
affect any property passing under an instrument, other than a will,
executed before the effective date of the Act.2'
Section 6 is a limiting provision:
This Act shall not apply in the case of wills, living
trusts, deeds, or contracts of insurance wherein provision
has been made for distribution of property different from
the provisions of this Act.22
Naturally if the intent of testator, donor, grantor or insured is
clear then it should be followed. The main provisions of the Act
are established to handle those unfortunate situations wherein one
has not expressly provided for the distribution of his property in
light of the possibility of simultaneous deaths.
CONCLUSION
It should be pointed out that this Act is not limited to deaths
occurring in common disasters but rather to those deaths where
there is no evidence to show that they died other than simulta-
18 United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S.W. 370 (1891).
19 13 FoRD. L. REV. 19, 31 (1944).
20 9 UNInom LAws ANN. 660 (1942).
21 N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 89 (5); MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 190A, § 2 (.Cum.
Supp. 1947).
22 9 UNn'osm LAws ANN. 660 (1942).
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neously. Too, this Act does not change the rules of evidence as to
what quantum of evidence is necessary to show survival. Rather,
once the court has determined that there is no sufficient evidence
then the Act establishes an orderly and equitable distribution of
the property and obviates the necessity of the court's using little
or no evidence to establish the priority of death.2"3
The Act apparently has covered every possibility as to the
distribution of property following simultaneous deaths of the par-
ties having an interest in the property. It goes much further than
do the present Ohio statutes. To be left to the unprovable burden-
of-proof formula as we now have in all situations other than that
covered by General Code Section 10503-18 is too harsh a solution.
This Uniform Act, which affords an equitable distribution of prop-
erty and which provides for ease in handling, would be an asset
to the laws of Ohio.
Jack W. Folkerth
23 See Ware v. Kinch, 29 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 353 (1919).
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